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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
MEMORY CONFORMITY: ACTORS AND BYSTANDERS
by
Mariana E. Carlucci
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Daniel B. Wright, Major Professor
This dissertation explored memory conformity effects on people who interacted
with a confederate and of bystanders to that interaction. Two studies were carried out.
Study 1 was conducted in the field. A male confederate approached a group of people at
the beach and had a brief interaction. About a minute later a research assistant
approached the group and administered a target-absent lineup to each person in the group.
Analyses revealed that memory conformity occurred during the lineup task. Bystanders
were twice as likely to conform as those who interacted with the confederate. Study 2
was carried out in a laboratory under controlled conditions. Participants were exposed to
two events during their time in the laboratory. In one event, participants were shown a
brief video with no determinate roles assigned. In the other event participants were
randomly assigned to interact with a confederate (actor condition) or to witness that
interaction (bystander condition). Participants were given memory tests on both events to
understand the effects of participant role (actor vs. bystander) on memory conformity.
Participants answered second to all questions, following a confederate acting as a
participant, who disseminated misinformation on critical questions. Analyses revealed no
significant differences in memory conformity between actors and bystanders during the
movie memory task. However, differences were found for the interaction memory task
vi

such that bystanders conformed more than actors on two of four critical questions.
Bystanders also conformed more than actors during a lineup identification task.
The results of these studies suggest that the role a person plays in an interaction
affects how susceptible they are to information from a co-witness. Theoretical and
applied implications are discussed. First, the results are explained through the use of two
models of memory. Second, recommendations are made for forensic investigators.
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Chapter I
Literature Review
Applied Problem
Legal psychologists and researchers have often focused on people’s memory of a
crime. However, there are benign interactions that can become focal points of a criminal
investigation. Consider the Timothy McVeigh case. McVeigh is responsible for the 1995
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
McVeigh rented a van from Elliot’s body shop two days before the bombing. While
there, two people interacted with him and one person witnessed one of the interactions.
First, McVeigh took care of some paperwork with Vicky Beemer. Second, he inspected
the van he was to rent with Eldon Elliot while Tom Kessinger (a mechanic) witnessed the
interaction. Two days later, when the truck he rented, filled now with explosives,
exploded the events that took place in Elliot’s body shop became an integral part of the
FBI’s criminal investigation. The scene that had taken place in Elliot’s body shop
included two actors (people who interacted with McVeigh) and one bystander (a person
who witnessed one of the interactions with McVeigh). An FBI agent interviewed Beemer,
Elliot and Kessinger regarding what they remembered about the man who had rented the
truck two days before. Beemer and Elliot gave general descriptions of the man while
Kessinger gave a more detailed account of the man. Because of these initial memory
reports Kessinger was asked to describe McVeigh to a forensic artist so that a sketch
could be sent out to other enforcement agencies around the country. Kessinger also told
the FBI agent that he had seen another man with McVeigh that day and that he believed
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they had acted together. A second sketch was drawn up and this sketch was also released
to the national media. The FBI was now looking for two men.
Though Beemer and Elliot had not initially reported information about an
accomplice, their stories soon began to change and they too reported seeing McVeigh
with another man. In addition, Beemer and Elliot’s stories became more detailed after
repeated interviews. Beemer noted that she was not sure what the second man looked like
but that she was sure he was there. Elliot described details, including the hat the second
man was wearing. Memory conformity was likely a contributing factor in this case. It
seems that the bystander (Kessinger) exerted influence on the actors (Beemer and Elliot)
in the McVeigh case, causing memory distortions (Memon & Wright, 1999). It is
important to note that the McVeigh case provides a real-world example of how different
eyewitnesses can influence each other but does not provide definitive information about
the direction of that influence. In this case the bystander influenced the actors but that
may not always be the case. However, the case illustrates an important, yet neglected,
issue regarding memory: Does the role someone plays in an interaction affect how
susceptible he/she is to misinformation? This is the question the current studies seek to
answer.
Human memory is fallible and can lead to innocent people being sent to prison
and guilty people left free to commit other crimes. As of May 2011, 269 people have
been exonerated through DNA testing (innocenceproject.org). These cases have spurred
much research because 75% of exoneration cases include faulty eyewitness memory.
While laypeople may see the human mind as a video camera, capturing everything we
experience, memory scholars know that this is not the case (Roediger, 1980). A multitude

2

of encoding and recall conditions can lead to memory errors. As a result, researchers have
conducted experiments to understand which conditions can lead to these errors. An
overwhelming amount of research shows that memory can be influenced by both
situational and individual factors.
Over a human lifespan one learns to rely on others for information (Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955). In fact, conformity is seen as an adaptive trait in some cultures (e.g.,
Japan), as it shows that one is tolerant and mature (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Thus,
people influence each other in many situations, including when they remember events.
People can re-experience an event by remembering it with others and details may be
added or removed, with little or no consequence (McIsaac & Eich, 2002). However, there
are times when remembering needs to be accurate (e.g., in criminal investigations).
Unfortunately, research shows that people sometimes incorrectly succumb to others’
recollections when remembering important events in situations where accuracy is of
utmost importance.
Theoretical Perspective: Informational and Normative Social Influence
Social psychologists often cite two influences that lead to conformity:
informational and normative (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). First, when information is not
obvious, people will conform to others because they are unsure of themselves and use the
group to glean the right answer (informational influence). Second, people conform
because they do not want to rebel against the group (normative influence). A series of
classic studies illustrate the conditions under which people may conform to others. In
1936, Sherif conducted an experiment showing informational influences on behavior.
Participants were seated in a dark room fifteen feet away from a pinpoint of a light.
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Participants then saw the light move. In reality the light did not move but as a result of
the autokinetic effect, participants “saw” the light move erratically and eventually
disappear. Participants were then asked to give an estimate of how far the light had
moved. One day later participants were brought back to the laboratory where they were
paired with two other participants. Each was asked to give an estimate (out loud) of how
far the light had moved. Sherif noted that the groups began to compromise and that a
group consensus was reached regarding the movement of the light. Because the
movement of light was ambiguous the group members relied on each other for
information about how far it had moved. These studies show the effect of informational
influence: in the absence of a clear right answer people are more likely to succumb to
what others say, which can lead them to be more correct or less correct depending on the
situation. Of course, in Sherif’s experiment the light did not move.
Another set of experiments by Asch (1951) shed light on social influence in
situations where a right answer is obvious. In Asch’s experiments each participant was
seated 6th in a row of 7 people. Their task was to compare a standard line to three lines
and report which matched. The right answer was obvious as the matching line was
substantially longer and shorter than the comparison lines. Participants were asked to
report their answers out loud in the order they were seated (i.e., person 1 through person
7). In the critical trial, confederates were instructed to pick the same obviously wrong
answer. Asch found that approximately 75% of participants conformed at least once
when confronted with several wrong answers. Those who answered each question alone
(control group) matched the lines correctly more than 99% of the time. The correct
answer was obvious yet participants still answered incorrectly because of social pressure
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from the rest of the group. In fact, going against the group was so stressful that one
participant had to excuse himself to vomit after each critical trial. The participant was
sure of his answer and went against the group, but suffered physical consequences from
the situation. In the Asch study, normative influence played a key role in the behavior of
participants. Hundreds of studies have replicated these results – that informational and
normative influences can affect how people act in groups. Indeed, social psychologists
have documented how humans interact. In his seminal book, Aronson (1972) discussed
the human mind and its need to interact with other human minds. We are social animals,
he explained, and memory is no different.
Since the classic studies by Sherif and Asch much research has been done on
conformity. Contemporary studies in conformity focus on three main reasons why people
conform to others: to be accurate, to affiliate, and to maintain a positive self-concept
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998). A meta-analysis by Bond and Smith (1996) showed across 133
studies in 17 countries that Asch-type line judgment tasks still led to some conformity.
The results also showed that collectivist countries showed higher levels of conformity
than individualistic countries. Studies in different areas of psychology show that people
do as others do. Phillips (1985, 1989), for example, found that suicide rates increase after
a highly publicized suicide. The increase happens only in places where the suicide story
is publicized. Psychologists have documented similar patterns in reports of hijackings and
UFO sightings (Bartholomew & Goode, 2000). Much research points to the following
conclusion: If one person does it, others will follow.
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Social Influence on Memory
Sherif’s and Asch’s studies show that people are influenced by others in many
different situations. Informational influences and normative influences affect conformity.
Using this conceptualization of conformity, memory researchers have attempted to
understand how social context could affect memory. Borrowing from the social-influence
literature, memory researchers developed a theory about how people remember in social
settings, known as the social-contagion of memory (Roediger, 1980; Roediger, Meade,
Bergman, 2001; Meade & Roediger, 2002) or memory conformity (Wright, Self &
Justice, 2000). Researchers found that remembering with others was detrimental to the
accuracy of memory reports. The main finding in these studies was that information
provided by a co-witness could be later recalled as witnessed information. Indeed, “false
memories are contagious; one person’s memory can be infected by another person’s
errors” (Roediger et al., 2001, p. 365).
As early as 1932 Bartlett wrote about the influence of others on one’s memory.
However, the social aspect of remembering was largely ignored during the behaviorist
era which was dominant in US psychology. It was not until well into the 20th century that
researchers began a systematic investigation of social influences on memory. For the past
35 years, Elizabeth Loftus and others have shown that introducing misinformation to
people after an event can create memory errors on a subsequent memory test. This
phenomenon has been termed the “post-event information effect” or the “misinformation
effect.” In past research, post-event information has been delivered via written narratives,
suggestive questioning and other people (Loftus, 2005). In Loftus’ original procedure
participants were presented with an original event (e.g., a car crashes after running a stop
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sign) and were then exposed to misleading post-event information (e.g., that the car
passed a yield sign). At test, participants were asked to choose between the original
information and the misinformation (e.g., the stop sign vs. the yield sign). Loftus found
that individuals exposed to misinformation were more likely to report the suggested
information than participants not presented with the errant information. Loftus originally
posited that the misinformation effect occurred via an “overriding” of memory. Her
explanation was that the original memories were overwritten by the misinformation such
that at test the misinformation had replaced the original information and could no longer
be recalled. In Loftus’ view the underlying reason for the error was strictly intrapersonal,
not interpersonal.
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) introduced the modified test to investigate the
misinformation effect. Unlike Loftus, they believed that people were not actually
recalling the misinformation but rather succumbing to social pressure from the
interviewer. They questioned whether the misinformation overwrites the original
information and adjusted the recall scenario to allow a test of that. In addition, they
proposed that the original misinformation paradigm may have led participants to select
the piece of misinformation as a result of memory gap filling because they had no
memory or a weak memory for the witnessed event and used the misinformation to fill in
the gaps. McCloskey and Zaragoza tested this notion by exposing participants to an event
(hammer), then exposing participants to misleading information (screwdriver) and finally
testing participants with the original information (hammer) and new information
(wrench). If the original information was selected instead of the new information then
exposure to the misinformation did not “override” the original memory. Indeed,
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McCloskey and Zaragoza found no evidence of memory impairment using this modified
test suggesting that results obtained by Loftus were due to social demand characteristics
or memory gap filling. In other words, they concluded that participants reported postevent misinformation due to what Belli (1989) calls “misinformation acceptance,” not
because the original memory was overwritten. Importantly, these studies found that there
was a social component in misremembering erroneous details.
Schneider and Watkins (1996) presented pairs of participants with words and
subsequently gave them an “old/new” recognition task. The recognition task included
previously seen words and new words (lures). The test was done in pairs, and they found
that what the first person reported influenced what the second person reported.
Misinformation provided by the first person lowered the hit rate (correcting identifying
an old word as old) by 10% and raised the false alarm rate (incorrectly identifying an old
word as new) by 20%. The Schneider and Watkins (1996) study inspired other
researchers to investigate why this phenomenon occurred.
Roediger, Meade and Bergman (2001) published a paper about the social
contagion of memory. Borrowing from the work of Loftus and classic conformity studies
like those of Asch, Roediger and his colleagues attempted to understand how social
context influenced memory. In their study a confederate (a research assistant working
with the researchers) was used to disseminate misinformation so that social influences on
subsequent recall could be measured. Two participants (one being a confederate) viewed
complex scenes together (e.g., kitchen, closet, etc.) and then recalled specific details from
each scene together. The confederate was trained to respond to some items correctly and
to some items incorrectly. Using this paradigm Roediger et al. (2001) were able to
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measure how much influence the confederate exerted in a recall task. The authors found
that participants in the contagion condition (where participants heard incorrect
information from the confederate) were more likely to make memory errors than those in
the no-contagion condition (where participants did not hear incorrect information from
the confederate). The results showed that participants were susceptible to misinformation
encountered in a co-witness situation.
Memory Conformity
At about the same time as the Roediger studies, another set of memory
researchers began using the term “memory conformity” to describe the process whereby
one person’s memory is affected by another’s memory (Wright, Self & Justice, 2000). In
a recent article, Roediger argued that memory conformity is likely a better term for the
phenomenon due to the negative connotations contagion inspires (2010) so memory
conformity is the term used herein. When witnesses report information they received
(directly or indirectly) from a co-witness then memory conformity has occurred. Cowitness conformity can have marked effects in the real world where crimes are often
witnessed by more than one person. In fact, Skagerberg and Wright (2008a) conducted a
survey of eyewitnesses who participated in lineups in the UK. They found that most
witnesses saw the crime with other people and that more than 50% talked to co-witnesses
about the crime. These figures underline a serious problem: people can “recall” erroneous
details gathered from co-witnesses that are then passed on as accurate (or at least
remembered) information. The problem is compounded by the fact that the legal system
(from investigators to juries) relies heavily on eyewitness information and rarely
questions the circumstances surrounding the information (e.g., co-witness contamination)
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(Loftus, 1974; Wells, Memon & Penrod, 2006). Thus, researchers have set out to
understand the conditions that lead to memory conformity in an effort to help
investigators gather only the most accurate information.
Wright, London and Waechter (2010; Figure 1) developed a model of memory
conformity using the social-influence literature previously discussed. They assert that
informational and normative processes are important in social memory contexts. First,
people conform because they do not want to disagree with others; disagreeing is costly in
the social marketplace (normative influence). Second, people conform because they trust
other people’s memory more than their own memory (informational influence). Thus, the
probability of responding with information gathered from another witness depends on
several things, including, belief in memory (the person’s and others’) and the cost of
disagreeing (including the cost of making an error). Several studies have investigated
these mechanisms and how they affect memory conformity. Some of these studies are
highlighted below.
Memory Conformity Methodology
Generally, there are three ways memory conformity research is conducted. First,
pairs of participants are shown stimuli (e.g., pictures, words) and then tested on these
together (Schneider & Watkins, 1996). The participants in these studies typically answer
between 50 to 100 memory questions, so the number of data points for each participant
makes this design powerful. The typical finding is that what the first person reports
affects what the second person reports, that is, the second person conforms, at least some
of the time, to the first person. A second strategy is to use a situation that is analogous to
an eyewitness experience. Participants view a mock crime and are encouraged to discuss
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details of the event with another participant (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003). In some
cases researchers have used confederates to disseminate errant information. Using
confederates is a way of controlling the type of information given to participants. The
typical finding in these studies is that some of the errant information gathered from a cowitness or confederate is later recalled as witnessed information. These designs more
closely mimic the real world but are less powerful because participant memory is tested
only for a few items. The third research approach provides participants with feedback
about the answers other people have provided. For example, a participant may be told
either that 90% or 30% of other people questioned said the same thing (Skagerberg &
Wright, 2009). Research designs that use confederates provide normative influences
while research designs that use feedback provide informational influence. Using these
designs researchers have shown that both informational and normative influences affect
memory, though in some studies it is difficult to discern which influence has more of an
impact on memory.
Normative Influence on Memory
Recall that one of the reasons people conform is to affiliate with others. People
want to be liked and sometimes conform to be accepted by others. Using this
conceptualization of conformity, Wright, London and Waechter (2010) found that
normative influence affects memory conformity. They found that two components of
social anxiety (fear of negative evaluation and social avoidance) moderated the memory
conformity effect. Participants in this study completed a Social Anxiety Scale for
Adolescents (SAS-S; La Greca & Lopez, 1998) and also completed a memory conformity
task. After completing the SAS-A pairs of participants saw the same 50 faces.

11

Participants then completed a memory test where they had to denote, on the same sheet,
whether the picture was ‘old’ or ‘new’. Participants were randomly selected to always go
first or always second on the 100 trials. The findings revealed that fear of negative
evaluation scores were positively correlated with memory conformity. Participants who
had a higher level of fear of negative evaluation were more likely to conform to their
memory test partners. This study suggests that the way individuals perceive the cost of
disagreeing is an important component in memory conformity. Furthermore, it shows that
normative influence is an important mechanism in memory conformity. In the La Greca
and Lopez study (1998), the socially anxious participants who exhibited fear of negative
evaluation were less likely to go against a co-witness, ostensibly for fear that they would
be looked at negatively and thus, conformed more compared to the socially anxious
participants who exhibited social avoidance.
In another study, Skagerberg and Wright (2008b) found that manipulating power
roles affected memory conformity. They had pairs of participants look at 50 faces on a
computer screen and then engage in a power task. The power task required that one
participant designed a restaurant (designer role) in 5 minutes and that the other
participant judged the restaurant (judge role) design on several dimensions (e.g.,
originality, practicality, etc.). The participants were randomly assigned to be either the
designer (low-power role) or the judge in the task (high-power role). Following this
procedure the participants completed a memory test for the previously seen faces. All
answers were recorded on the same sheet to allow the second person to see what the first
person wrote. The results of this study showed that low-power participants (designers)
were more influenced by high-power participants (judges) than vice versa. Normative
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influence is one possible explanation for the findings. It is possible that the low-power
participants felt more pressure to agree with the high-power participant and conformed to
avoid negative evaluation. The Skagerberg and Wright (2008b) study is particularly
relevant to the proposed studies as it shows that the role someone plays in an event can
affect how susceptible they are to misinformation.
Informational Influence on Memory
Other studies have looked at informational influence on memory conformity.
Informational influence is often exerted when a person is not sure of their answer and
looks towards others in the group for the right answer. Gabbert, Memon and Wright
(2007) manipulated perceived encoding duration in a memory conformity experiment.
People who were tested in pairs were told that one person had encoded a set of pictures
for either half or twice as long as the other person. However, encoding time was the same
for all participants. Participants who were told they had less encoding time were more
likely to conform to their partner than those who were told that they had more encoding
time. That is, memory conformity was larger because of the belief that the other person
had more accurate information to report, leading to memory conformity. They showed
that an individual’s beliefs about the quality of their own memory in comparison to
another person’s memory affected memory conformity.
In another study, Wright, Self and Justice (2000, Exp. 2) showed pairs of people
slightly different photographs of a crime scene. The critical difference was that one
participant saw the criminal with an accomplice while the other participant saw only the
criminal. Following the photographs participants completed an individual memory test
that asked them about the critical detail (whether there was an accomplice or not) and
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their confidence for that question. Participants were then told to discuss the details of the
photographs they had seen. Following discussion each person was asked if there was an
accomplice. The authors found that 75% of groups conformed within the pair regarding
the accomplice question. The person who conformed tended to have lower confidence
than the person who did not conform. The extra confidence exerted by the participant
may have served as a cue to accuracy. The results of this study show that informational
influence, again, plays a role in how people report their memory. That is, if one person
believes another person’s memory is more accurate (through cues such as confidence)
then the person is more likely to conform to the other, more accurate, person than vice
versa.
Taken together, these studies show that there are social-influence mechanisms at
work in memory conformity. The probability of conforming to another’s memory
depends on the cost of disagreeing (normative influences) and belief in memory
(informative influence). Memory researchers hope that understanding these mechanisms
may lead to more information about when memory conformity happens and how to
decrease memory conformity in situations where it might be detrimental (e.g., criminal
investigations).
The Current Studies
For the purposes of these studies, actors (or interlocutors) are described as people
who interact with a target and bystanders are described as people who witness that
interaction. The current studies propose that these two roles will have different levels of
memory conformity. A few studies have investigated memory of actors and bystanders
outside the memory conformity literature. The focus of these studies is often victims of a
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crime versus bystanders to a crime and thus, confound the results of these studies.
Nevertheless, the results of these studies have been inconsistent. Some studies show that
actors are more accurate in lineup identifications than bystanders (Hosch & Cooper,
1982) while others show that bystanders are more accurate (Kassin, 1984).
Hosch and Cooper (1982) investigated victimization as a determinant of
eyewitness accuracy. Participants were run in pairs where one subject was the victim of a
crime (personal vs. impersonal) and the other was a witness to that crime. A control
condition was included for comparison purposes. After the crime occurred participants
were asked to pick the thief out of a lineup. There was a significant difference between
the theft conditions and the control condition such that participants in the theft conditions
had the highest lineup accuracy. Participants in the control condition had the poorest
accuracy. The authors argue that the results were due to the amount of attention
participants gave to the thief. That is, a criminal act is likely to command attention
leading to better encoding of the confederate and subsequent lineup performance. This
may also be the case in more innocuous/non-criminal events where one person’s attention
is focused on a target and another person’s attention is not.
Kassin (1984) also investigated eyewitness performance for victims and
bystanders. In his study 15 pairs of participants were seated at a table where they played a
risk-taking competitive game. During the game a confederate entered the room and stole
the game money from one of the participants (victim) while the other participant watched
from across the table (bystander). All participants were given a lineup identification task
that they completed by themselves. Approximately half of the bystanders correctly
identified the thief in a lineup while none of the victims made an accurate identification.

15

Thus, in this study bystanders had superior accuracy, albeit with a small sample size. The
problem with the two studies described above is that they investigate eyewitness lineup
performance for victims of a mock-crime versus bystanders to that crime and thus, tell us
little about how memories for other types of events are affected by actor and bystander
roles. They also tell us little about memory for victimless events for actors and
bystanders.
In terms of memory for events, the results are also inconsistent. Ihlebaek, Love,
Eilertsen and Magnussen (2003) had participants either actively engage in a staged
robbery or watch a staged robbery on video. They found that participants who viewed the
video of the robbery (peripheral witness) were more accurate when recalling the event
than participants who engaged in the robbery (central witness). However, in this same
study the authors found that level of involvement also had an effect on accuracy such that
witnesses close to the scene had greater accuracy than witnesses further away from the
scene. One reason for the inconsistent results may have to do with the methods employed.
First, two of the three studies show observers to be more accurate using videos to show
stimulus materials instead of live events. The fact that actors and bystanders in those
studies encoded information through different sources (live event vs. video) may have
affected how participants encoded the information and thus, the accuracy of their
memories. Indeed, the authors concede that the level of involvement was correlated with
accuracy. One could argue that the level of involvement between live events and
watching a video are different and may lead to different memory performance regardless
of the role (central vs. peripheral) the witness played in the event. Thus, it is difficult to
extrapolate any conclusions from the results of the study.
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In one of the few field studies on actors and bystanders, Woolnough and
MacLeod (2001) found that actors and bystanders were equally accurate in their accounts
of a real crime. Fourteen witnesses of a robbery at a supermarket were interviewed 3
months after the crime. The authors used surveillance video to establish ground truth and
assess memory accuracy. They calculated accuracy rates for central witnesses (those who
were involved in the event and questioned by police) and peripheral witnesses (less
involved and not questioned by police) and found no differences in accuracy between
these two groups, though central witnesses did provide more information.
None of the studies reviewed above examine memory (or memory conformity) for
actors and bystanders in a victimless event. However, there are forensically relevant
events that do not include victims, but rather people who interact with a target and those
who witness this interaction. How this differentiation affects memory and memory
conformity, in particular, is a topic that has received little empirical attention.
Actors and Bystanders: Memory Conformity
Little information is currently available regarding memory conformity for actors
and bystanders in an event. Researchers have, however, investigated memory for people
performing an action and people observing an action. In a typical study, participants are
instructed either to perform an action (e.g., put the letter in the envelope) or to observe
another participant performing that action. All participants are then given a memory test.
Numerous studies show that self-performed tasks are better remembered than observed
actions (Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1985; Manzi & Nigro, 2008). One could argue that selfperformed actions are better remembered (i.e., create stronger memories) and thus, are
less likely to lead to conformity as one component of memory conformity is
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informational influence (Roediger et al., 2001; Wright, Self & Justice, 2000). That is, a
person who has a better memory for an event may be less susceptible to influence from a
co-witness.
Belief in one’s memory seems to be a critical variable in memory conformity.
Even just thinking that one has a better memory may buffer people against the memory
conformity effect. Gabbert, Memon and Wright (2007) found that people who thought
they had encoded information for longer were less likely to conform than people who
thought they had encoded the information for less time. One explanation for this finding
is that people who believed they had encoded information for longer also believed they
had better memories, leading to less memory conformity.
As mentioned, no studies have looked at memory conformity for actors and
bystanders. However, the practical significance of this issue requires further attention.
Some criminal investigations may involve both people who interact with a target (actors)
and witnesses to that interaction (bystanders). Unfortunately, we have little information
about how actors compared to bystanders behave when confronted with misleading
information. This information could be of great value to law enforcement officials when
gathering information about a crime. For example, they may weigh information from
actors and bystanders differently if one of them is more likely than the other to conform.
Thus, the results of the current studies have applicable value. Theoretically, the current
studies will expand the literature on memory conformity, thereby expanding the currently
available theories of memory. The results will be discussed in terms of current models of
memory conformity. Study 1 was conducted as a field study to maximize ecological
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validity. Based on the results of Study 1, Study 2 was carried out in a laboratory setting
with additional variables of interest.
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Chapter II
Study 1
Study 1 compared memory conformity effects of people who interacted with a
confederate, and of bystanders to that interaction. The study was carried out in the field in
an effort to mimic real-world conditions (increase ecological validity). A naturalistic
setting was used to assess memory conformity for people who, at the time of encoding,
do not know they are participating in a psychological study.
Participants
People were approached by a male confederate at a public beach in South Florida.
Three hundred and ninety-three participants, within 176 groups, took part in the study.
The mean age was 30 years and fifty-six percent of participants were female. Most
groups were of two people (86%).
Procedure
A confederate (see Figure 1) approached a group of people and asked one person
for the time. This interaction lasted about 10s to 15s, depending on how long it took a
person to answer the question. After about a 1-minute delay (to allow the confederate to
be out-of-sight) a research assistant approached each group, introduced themselves as a
researcher, and asked if they would participate in a research study. If participants agreed
to participate they were given a consent form to read and sign (see Appendix A). Once
consent was given the research assistant continued with the study. Depending on the
condition, the research assistant spoke either the “actor” (the person the confederate
spoke to) or the “bystander” (the person who witnessed the interaction between the actor
and the confederate) first. To illustrate, in a typical “actor” condition, the research
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assistant approached the group and asked the person who previously interacted with the
confederate to pick the man that had just asked for the time out of the lineup. After
recording this information, the research assistant turned to the other group member (in
this example, the bystander) and then asked them to pick the man out of the lineup. The
same procedure was followed for the “bystander” condition, except that in this case, the
research assistant asked the bystander in the group for an identification first and before
getting an identification from the actor in the group. Using this design we could later test
if the actor or bystander exerted more influence on the second respondent. The research
assistant then held up the target-absent lineup and, in front of the other group member,
asked the person to: “Pick the man that asked for the time out of this lineup”. The
research assistant repeated the question for the other member of the group. Gender and
age information were recorded and groups were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Materials
Lineup
The target-absent lineup (see Figure 1) was made using general facial
characteristics of the confederate. The lineup was pretested to ensure that none of the six
fillers stood out. The lineup was printed in color. A target-absent lineup was used to
ensure that no individual choice stood out. A target-absent lineup was used to ensure that
misinformation was always provided to other participants. Laboratory studies often use
confederates to disseminate misinformation but this was not an option in the current
study because it was carried out in a naturalistic setting. Thus, using a more difficult task
(e.g., target-absent lineup) allowed us to look only at conformity trials during our
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analyses. For example, say 90% were choosing person A (actual target), then 90% of the
second responders would be in a position where conforming could be due to conforming
or memory. This would leave only 10% of the sample which would not allow us to
disentangle these two mechanisms. This would be too small a sample.
Analyses
Because most groups consisted of two people (86%), our analyses included the
first two people in each group only. A chi-square test was used to test the association
between what the first person said and what the second person said. This analysis will
reveal which person (bystander vs. actor) exerted more influence during the lineup
identification task.
Hypothesis
The main hypothesis for this study is that bystanders will conform more than
actors on the lineup identification task. That is, actors will exert more influence on
bystanders than vice-versa.
Results
Because most groups consisted of two people (86%), our analyses will be just of
the first two people in each group. Table 1 shows the responses of the first person with
the responses of the second person. A chi-square test was used to test the association
between what the first person said and what the second person said. The χ2 refers to
residual χ2 of the no association model, so 71.31 is a measure of association. It is
statistically significant, likelihood ratio χ2(36) = 71.31, p < .001, Cramér's V = .27. This
shows that what the first person said affected what the second person said. Most of this
association is due to large values on the diagonal (in bold italics) corresponding to when
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the second person gave the same response as the first person said. If the χ2 test is re-run
with the expected values for the diagonal entries being the observed values, the model fits
well, χ2(30) = 32.94, p = .33. This is a significant improvement, χ2(6) = 38.37, p < .001
over the previous model. This shows that the association between what the first person
says and what the second person says is due to the second person conforming, and not
some other anomalous pattern. About half of the residual χ2 is accounted for by the
second person making the same choice as the first person.
Table 2 shows how often the second person gave the same response as the first
person, broken down by whether the second person was a bystander or not. If people
were randomly guessing among six choices, we would expect only 17% conformity. In
total, 34% of the time, the second person gave the same response as the first person.
Importantly, 44% of bystanders conformed while only 24% of the people who interacted
with the confederate conformed, χ2(1, N = 176) = 7.67, p < .01. This is an odds ratio of
2.45, 95% confidence interval from 1.29 to 4.64. This shows that bystanders to the
interaction were twice as likely to conform as people who spoke directly to the
confederate.
It was hypothesized that actors would exert more influence on bystanders during
the lineup identification task in this study. The results of the study confirm this
hypothesis. There was an association between what the first person responded and what
the second person responded. When participant role was analyzed the results revealed
that bystanders were more than twice as likely to conform to an actor than vice-versa.
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Discussion
Study 1 investigated memory conformity for actors and bystanders in the field. A
confederate approached a group of people on a public beach and interacted with one
person in the group for a short period of time. Actors in that interaction and bystanders to
the interaction were then presented with a target-absent lineup and were asked to make an
identification. Analyses showed a memory conformity effect such that there was an
association between what the first person said and what the second person said. In other
words, the first respondent’s lineup identification influenced the second respondent’s
lineup identification. Further analyses revealed that bystanders were twice as likely to
conform as people who engaged in the interaction (actors). This may shed some light as
to how memory conformity works in naturalistic settings and it has important
implications.
One possible reason for the findings of Study 1 is that actors pay more attention
than bystanders. Attention is important in encoding and hence later remembering. Details
that receive little visual processing are poorly remembered (Posner, Snyder & Davidson,
1980). Research on eye movement shows that eye fixations are correlated with memory.
We remember what we look at the most (Buswell, 1935). Actors in this study were forced
to pay attention to the confederate because something was asked of them (i.e., the time).
The request shifted visual attention to the confederate and may have enhanced memory.
Such pressure was not placed on bystanders in this study.
Study 1 provides rich information about how actors and bystanders react when given
misinformation during a lineup identification task. However, there are methodological
constraints associated with field studies that limit the scope of the results. Study 2 was
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designed to rectify some of the major methodological concerns of study 1 and to expand
the findings to situations other than lineup identifications. First, study 1 included a targetabsent lineup only, giving researchers little information about what occurs when
participants are presented with a target-present lineup. Study 2 included both a targetpresent and a target-absent lineup. Second, it may be that the results in study 1 were due
to other influences that the researchers could not control in the field. Study 2 provided
more experimental control as it was conducted in a laboratory. Third, study 1 included
only one memory task (a lineup identification) due to constraints inherent in field studies.
Study 2 included several memory tasks that facilitated richer comparisons. Fourth, the
groups that participated in study 1 knew each other, meaning that there may have been
other social dynamics at play that lead to memory conformity. Participants in Study 2
completed the experiment with a confederate-participant, whom they were not acquainted
with. Thus, dynamics inherent in friendships that may affect memory conformity could
not interfere in study 2. Fifth, bystanders in study 1 were not required to provide attention
to the confederate. Study 2 was designed so that both bystanders and actors were under
the same attentional conditions to ensure that the only difference between roles was who
spoke directly to the confederate.
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Chapter III
Study 2
Study 2 investigated memory conformity for actors and bystanders in a controlled
laboratory setting.
Participants
Two hundred and thirty-six participants were recruited from the Psychology
department at Florida International University. Participants signed up for the study using
SONA systems and received 1 credit of research participation. Participants were mostly
female (74%) and Hispanic (67%) and were between the ages of 16 and 54 with a mean
age of 21 (SD = 5 years). Participants under 18 years of age were required to turn in a
Parental Consent Form as per FIU Institutional Review Board guidelines.
Design
The study used a 2 (lineup: target-present vs. target-absent) by 2 (confederate
response: right vs. wrong) by 2 (role: actor vs. bystander) factorial design. Participants
were exposed to two events during their time in the laboratory: a control event (a film)
and the critical event (interruption from a confederate). Participants were given memory
tests for both of these events and also engaged in a lineup identification task.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were be given a consent form
(Appendix B), which they read and signed to participate in the study. Participants were
seated at a table with another participant (Confederate 1). All participants filled out a
Demographic Questionnaire (Appendix C). The research assistant explained that they
were going to view a brief video and that she would be back at the end of the video. The
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research assistant stepped out of the room and the participants viewed an 11-minute
documentary about the future. At the end of the video a female confederate (Confederate
2) entered the laboratory and spoke to the person sitting closest to the door. Half of the
time the person sitting closest to the door was the participant (Actor Condition) and half
of the time it was confederate 1 (Bystander Condition). The female confederate
memorized a script in which she disseminated information that would later be used to
measure each participant’s memory for that portion of the experiment (See Appendix D
for script). This interruption lasted approximately one minute. About a minute after
Confederate 2 left the room the Research Assistant came back and began the memory test
portion of the study by asking participants to pick a piece of paper out of a cup that would
determine who got to answer first and who got to answer second. This was arranged so
that both papers said “2” but Confederate 1 was trained to say they picked a “1” from the
cup. This assured that Confederate 1 always answered memory questions first and the
participant always answered memory questions second. The Research Assistant began the
memory test by asking participants six questions about the video they had previously
watched (Appendix E). For every question Confederate 1 was instructed to answer first
and the participant was instructed to answer second. All questions were answered out
loud. The research assistant recorded verbatim answers given by the confederate and
participant on a sheet of paper. Confederate 1 was trained to always answer questions 1
and 3 correctly (to diminish suspicion) and half the time answered either questions 2 and
5 correctly (4 and 6 incorrectly) or 4 and 6 correctly (2 and 5 incorrectly). After both
participants answered the six questions about the video the Research Assistant explained
that the woman who had interrupted the study was part of the study and that she was now
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going to ask them a series of questions about what the woman said (Appendix F). Again,
for every question Confederate 1 was instructed to answer first and the participant was
instructed to answer second. All questions were answered out loud. The research assistant
recorded verbatim answers given by the confederate and participant on a sheet of paper.
Confederate 1 was trained to always answer questions 1 and 3 correctly and half the time
answered either questions 2 and 5 correctly (4 and 6 incorrectly) or 4 and 6 correctly (2
and 5 incorrectly). After both participants answered the six questions the Research
Assistant gave participants a lineup from which to choose the girl who interrupted the
study. Confederate 1 was instructed to pick someone from the lineup and to state their
confidence in their decision on a scale from 1 (not confident) to 10 (very confident). Half
of the time Confederate 1 was very confident in their decision (“I am an 8 on a 1-10
scale”) and half of the time they were not very confident in their decision (“I am a 2 on
the 1-10 scale”). These decisions were made out loud and the participant could see and
hear the lineup identification Confederate 1 made. In the Target-Absent condition the
confederate picked each member of the lineup an equal number of times. In the TargetPresent condition the confederate picked the right person half of the time and picked a
filler the other half of the time. The participant was asked to pick someone out of the
lineup immediately after the confederate completed their identification. The Research
Assistant then asked participants to complete the final questionnaire (Appendix G – Cost
of Disagreeing). Once participants had completed that questionnaire they were asked two
suspicion questions (Appendix H): 1. What do you think this study is about? 2. Do you
feel like you were deceived or were you suspicious about anything during your time in
this study? The Research Assistant recorded the participants’ answers to these questions
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and proceeded to the debriefing portion of the experiment (Appendix I). After debriefing
participants had an opportunity to ask questions about the study. When all questions were
answered participants were thanked for their time and given credit on SONA Systems.
Materials
Video
The video was adapted from the documentary, 2057, which depicts how humans
will live 50 years in the future. The documentary is approximately 50 minutes in duration
but was edited to 11-minutes for the purposes of this experiment. The video shows the
life of a young boy and his mother in the future and there is commentary from scientists
in between these scenes. The video was chosen for several reasons. First, it included a
great deal of information that made it possible to construct a memory questionnaire to test
participants’ memory for the video. Second, we anticipated that not many people would
have seen the documentary before completing the study. In fact, only one participant
reported having seen the video outside of the experiment.
Target-absent lineup
To construct a target-absent lineup ten people were asked to describe each of the
two confederates used in the study. Using this information a target-absent lineup was
constructed by finding fillers that fit the general description of the target. The targetabsent lineup was pre-tested using twenty people to ensure that no one stood out from the
lineup. Each participant was given a description and asked to pick someone out of the
lineup. No person stood out from the lineup.

29

Target-present lineup
The target-present lineup was constructed by replacing foil number 6 on the
target-absent lineup with a picture of the target.
Cost of disagreeing questionnaire
The questionnaire (Appendix G) was adapted from Carol, Eaton, Carlucci &
Wright (manuscript in preparation) to assess participant’s feelings about the cost of
disagreeing. The questions were designed to understand if participants were more
concerned about being right or more concerned about being liked by others. The scale for
each question ranges from 1 to 7, with lower scores indicating a desire to be right and
higher scores indicating a desire to be liked.
Analyses
The main goal of the study was to see who exerted more influence: actors in an
event or bystanders in an event. The main variable of interest was whether the participant
conformed to what the confederate said. Each participant was randomly assigned to the
actor role or bystander role. After both events (documentary and interruption) participants
were given a memory test and a lineup task where the confederate delivered either correct
or incorrect information. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous (conformity/no
conformity) logistic regression was used. Mixed logistic regression is used to predict the
dependent variables on the basis of several independent variables. The current study
included multiple items. One advantage is that several predictor variables (numerical or
categorical) can be included in the regression. This allowed the researcher to determine
the relative importance of the independent variables, and to assess any interaction effects
that may exist.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: There will be no differences in memory conformity between
bystanders and actors on memory for the movie.
Hypothesis 2: Bystanders will conform more than actors on memory for the
interaction than memory for the movie.
Hypothesis 3: Bystanders will conform more than actors on the lineup
identification task.
Results
Manipulation Check
Participants were asked two questions during a suspicion probe. For question 1
(“What do you think this study is about?”), 76% mentioned topics unrelated to the nature
and hypotheses of the study. For question 2 (“Do you feel like you were deceived or were
you suspicious about anything during your time in this study?”), 82% said they did not
feel deceived or suspicious during the study. None of the participants mentioned the
participant-confederate as a source of suspicion so no participants were dropped from the
analysis. The results of the cost of disagreeing questionnaire (below) also show the
manipulation did not change how groups reported the cost of disagreeing.
Cost of Disagreeing Questionnaire
Participant’s answers to the cost of disagreeing questionnaire were used to
determine if they could be used as a scale to measure if participants were more concerned
about being right or more concerned about being liked by others. The first step in
assessing the scale was to look at the correlation between all items. A correlation matrix
revealed all items were significantly correlated with at least two other items, suggesting
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reasonable collinearity. Next, a principal components analysis, a mathematical procedure
that allows for variable reduction, was conducted to assess if the items represented one
underlying component. All items had a loading above .4, meaning that each item mapped
on to one underlying component. The scale ranges from 1 (more concerned with being
right) and 7 (more concerned with being liked). Items 1 and 5 were reversed scored to
adhere to this scale. Next, the reliability index Cronbach’s alpha was computed.
Cronbach’s alpha was .569, showing moderate reliability. All of these measures indicated
that the five items were measuring one underlying construct. Using this information we
used the average score on the five items as a scale of conformity for each participant. The
mean score on the conformity scale was 2.92 (SD = .926). The mean score for
participants assigned to the bystander role was 2.93 (SD = .92) and the mean score for
participants assigned to the actor role was 2.90 (SD = .93). This difference was not
statistically significant, t (231) = -.310, p = .90.
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression was used to analyze most of the data. An advantage of logistic
regression is that it allows the researcher to predict binary data (Wright & London, 2009),
which is useful in the current study as the main variable of interest is whether the
participant agrees or disagrees with the participant-confederate. A repeated measures
logistic regression, using the R package lme4, was used to examine multiple dependent
variables.
Movie Questions
A model including the confederate’s answer to the movie questions showed that
participants were more likely to be right if the confederate responded with the correct
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answer. Participants were more likely to be wrong if the confederate gave an incorrect
answer, χ2(1) = 36.0, p < .001. The results show a memory conformity effect such that
participants agree with the confederate. Next, a model was constructed to include
participant role (actor vs. bystander). There were no main effects for participant role,
χ2(1) = 1.5, p = .22. Next, a model was constructed to test for interactions between
memory conformity and participant role. Specifically, this model tested whether
participant role moderated the memory conformity effect, which is measured by whether
the confederate’s response affects the participant’s response. Results showed that
memory conformity was not moderated by participant role for the movie questions, χ2(1)
= 2.0, p = .16.
Interaction Questions
Table 3 shows a summary of the data for all interaction questions. Results showed
that participants agreed with the confederate but this effect was moderated by the role the
participant played and by questions, χ2(3) = 69.1, p < .001. To see where these
differences occurred, models that included each critical question were constructed.
Results showed that for questions 2 and 4, participant role was significant. For question
2, bystanders were more likely to agree (35% for bystanders vs. 22% actors). For
question 4, bystanders were more likely to agree with confederates (19% for bystander
vs. 6% for actors). There were no significant differences between actors and bystanders
for the other two critical questions (see Table 3).
Lineup Task
A logistic regression was conducted to assess performance on the lineup task.
Table 4 shows a summary of the data.
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Target-present lineup
Lineup agreement (whether the participant agreed with the confederate’s choice)
was influenced by the lineup decision of the confederate (right vs. wrong) and by the
participant’s role (actor vs. bystander). Memory conformity was found such that
participant were likely to agree with the confederate, χ2(1) = 48.3, p < .001. Participants
were more likely to agree with the confederate if they were bystanders than if they were
actors, χ2(1) = 4.1, p = .04.
Target-absent lineup
Lineup agreement (whether the participant agreed with the confederate’s choice)
was influenced by the lineup decision of the confederate (right vs. wrong) but not by the
participant’s role (actor vs. bystander). Memory conformity was found such that
participant were likely to agree with the confederate, χ2(1) = 5.4, p = .02. Participant role
had no influence, χ2(1) = .04, p = .83.
Discussion
Study 2 included two events, which allowed the researcher to compare memory
processes for an event where people were not in any determinate role and an event where
people were randomly assigned a role (actor vs. bystander). Participants viewed an 11minute movie together during which no roles were assigned and also were exposed to a
target and accompanying information in a specific role (actor vs. bystander). This
allowed the researcher to compare two events where one predicted participant role (actor
vs. bystander) would moderate the memory conformity effect and one predicted
participant role would not moderate the memory conformity effect. The movie portion of
the study, in effect, served as a control condition and manipulation check.
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Similar to the results of study 1, the results of study 2 suggest that the role someone
plays in an interaction does affect how susceptible they are to information delivered by a
confederate. The results of the memory test for the movie questions showed the typical
memory conformity effect. A multilevel logistic regression was conducted and it showed
that participants agreed with the confederate when the confederate was correct and
incorrect. No significant effects were found for participant role. This result confirms
hypothesis 1 – that participants would not differ in memory conformity for the movie
memory questions.
The critical event was the interruption of the study by a confederate. It was during
this task that participants were either directly spoken to by the confederate (actor
condition) or witnessed this event (bystander condition). Based on results from study 1 it
was hypothesized that bystanders would conform to actors on a subsequent memory test
for the interaction. The results of the memory test for the interaction questions showed
typical memory conformity effects but they were moderated by participant role, such that
bystanders were more likely to agree on two of four critical questions. This result
partially confirms hypothesis 2 – that participants assigned to the bystander role would
conform more than participants assigned to the actor role for the interaction memory
questions. The differences in memory conformity for the two events shows that the role
participants played affected how likely they were to conform to a confederate.
Study 2 included a lineup identification task where the participant was asked to pick
the person who interrupted the study out of a lineup. The participant heard the lineup
identification made by the participant-confederate. The results for the lineup task follow
the same pattern of results as the memory for the interaction. In the target-present lineup
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participants showed the typical memory conformity effect. More importantly, participants
were more likely to agree with the confederate if they were bystanders than if they were
actors. This result partially confirms hypothesis 3 – that bystanders would conform more
than actors during the lineup identification.
The results of study 2 provide information about memory processes during collective
remembering tasks. The results also expand the finding to memory for an event and for
several pieces of information. Participants who were bystanders in the interaction were
more likely to conform to questions regarding the interaction than during questions
regarding the movie they viewed. This suggests that interacting with a target and
witnessing an interaction with a target leads to differing levels of memory conformity.
The results of study 2 can be explained using the concepts of normative influence
and informational influence on conformity. The results suggest that normative influence
did not play a big role in memory conformity. First, all participants (regardless of role)
reported that they would rather be correct than be liked on the cost of disagreeing
questionnaire. Second, we did not find any significant interactions in the movie memory
task. If participants were concerned about being liked or affiliating with the other
participant they would have conformed on both tasks but they only conformed on the
interaction memory task. Third, participants conformed to 2 of 4 critical questions in the
interaction memory task. If they were conforming due to normative influence they would
have conformed to all critical questions at a similar rate. Thus, it seems as though
informational influence played a part in how participants conformed in this study. Indeed,
it may be that bystanders felt that actors had more information or paid more attention to
the person that interrupted the study. This may have created a reliance on the other
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participant’s memory which may manifest itself as memory conformity on more difficult
questions. In terms of Wright et. al. (2010) memory conformity model, it may be that
bystanders believed the other participant had better memory for the event and conformed
in an effort to be correct.
As with many laboratory studies, one limitation of study 2 is that the participants
may have conformed because they found the task somewhat innocuous. Conforming
about details regarding a movie or a seemingly random interruption may differ from
conforming about details regarding a bank robber or other criminal scenario. However,
there is mounting evidence that different roles can lead to different memory processes,
including memory conformity (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008b). Indeed, the results of study
1 show that memory conformity is more pronounced for bystanders in a naturalistic
setting.
A second limitation of study 2 is that the design of this study does not allow the
researcher to discern differences between normative and informational influences. In an
effort to make the study more ecologically valid all memory tests were conducted in front
of the participant-confederate. We also cannot be sure of participant’s beliefs in their
memory and other’s memory as this was not measured. Nevertheless, the goal of the
study was to understand how actors and bystanders would react when confronted with
misinformation from a co-witness. Finally, study 2 included constrained dialogue.
Memory conformity effects may differ depending on the type of information being
recalled and the length of interaction. Future studies may opt to include extended
interactions and more naturalistic dialogue.
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Chapter IV
General Discussion
The goal of the current studies was to assess differences in memory performance for
actors and bystanders of an event. Both real-life cases (e.g, Timothy McVeigh) and field
studies (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008) illustrate the importance of this line of research.
Crimes witnessed by more than one person are prevalent and research shows that people
do often discuss details of an event with others who witnessed that event. Unfortunately,
the results of these discussions can lead to memory errors that may affect actual
investigations. In these studies, the question of interest was whether playing a different
role in an event would lead to more or less memory conformity.
Very little research has examined how interacting with a target versus witnessing
that interaction affects memory processes. Most of the available literature has focused on
the memory processes for victims and bystanders (Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Ihlebaek,
Love, Eilertsen & Magnussen, 2003; Kassin, 1984; Woolnough & McLeod, 2001).
However, not all criminal situations include victims. Thus, it is important to understand
memory processes of people who interact with a target and those who witness this
interaction. Of particular interest was the amount of memory conformity displayed by
participants in these roles.
The results of study 1 and study 2 can be applied to real-world cases and suggest that
the role someone plays in an interaction may affect their susceptibility to information
gathered from a co-witness. Think of a stereotypical bank robbery where the bank robber
speaks directly to a teller while others witness this interaction. Any discussion after the
bank robber has left could lead to memory conformity and memory errors. The teller may
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leak erroneous information about the bank robber that can later be reported by bystanders
as witnessed details. Thus, it is not only important to emphasize the importance of
preventing post-event discussions but also knowing what the memory risks are if postevent discussions have occurred.
Many criminal cases hinge on eyewitness evidence such as positive identifications
from the witness on a lineup task. A lineup task was also included in the current studies
as the results could have applied value. Results of these studies show that bystanders are
more likely to conform to actors in both target-absent and target-present lineups. In study
1 it was found that bystanders were twice as likely to conform on a target-absent lineup
than actors. Study 2 showed that memory conformity was higher for bystanders in targetpresent lineups. In fact, 22% of bystanders conformed to an incorrect answer from a
confederate while only 11% of actors conformed to an incorrect answer from a
confederate. This difference was statistically significant. These results suggest that
investigators need to take the role someone plays in an interaction into account when
weighing lineup ID’s. The results of study 2 are especially sobering as they suggest that
almost a quarter of bystanders opted to pick a filler even when the target was in the
lineup.
Finally, the results of study 1 and 2 are particularly notable as they are based on both
a college student sample and a real-world sample. One critique of psychological research
is that it is often done under contrived conditions with a specific sample (college
students). Study 1 provides information gathered in a naturalistic setting with members of
the community, showing that memory conformity for actors and bystanders occurs
outside of the laboratory as well.
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Toward a Model of Memory Conformity
Many studies have explored individual components that can lead to memory
conformity. Wright, London and Waechter (2010) proposed a model that encompasses
what researchers believe to be the important elements in memory conformity research,
but it lacks quantitative predictability. The model uses the cost of disagreeing, cost of
making an error, belief in other’s memory and belief in one’s memory to make
predictions about the probability of conforming. It is often difficult separate these
components so some studies have focused on the “cost” portion of the model and others
have focused on the “beliefs” portion of the model.
The results of the current studies show that these elements manifest themselves in
different ways. For example, one reason bystanders may have conformed more was due
to pressure to agree with someone they believed had a better memory for the interaction.
That is, their beliefs in their own memory and the other participant’s memory caused
them to conform.
Charman, Carlucci, Vallano and Hyman-Gregory (2010) proposed a framework
of how eyewitnesses assess their confidence following a lineup identification. The model
purports that eyewitnesses engage in a three-step process when assessing confidence:
assessment, search, and evaluation. The model can also be used to explain other
eyewitness phenomena and may help elucidate why bystanders seem to conform more
than actors. Using this model, during the first stage a bystander will assess their internal
cues for accuracy (e.g., memory strength). If these internal cues are weak (e.g., low
memory strength), bystanders will enter stage two where they will search for external
cues. In this case, the misinformation provided by the co-witness (actor) serves as an
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external cue. Finally, the bystander will evaluate the external cue before incorporating the
incorrect answer in their memory recall. This is where bystanders may be particularly
susceptible to information from an actor who is seemingly credible (after all, they were
the person whom the confederate spoke to). The Charman et. al. model predicts that
credible sources will lead to integration of a cue while non-credible sources will lead to
discarding of a cue. In this case, actors may display more credibility and their information
seen as a viable correct answer, thereby leading bystanders to agree.
Future studies on memory conformity should perhaps focus on disentangling the
effects of normative and informational influences by manipulating conditions for each in
individual studies. The current studies are a stepping-stone for gathering more
information about memory conformity for actors and bystanders. The results show that
bystanders are more likely to agree with a co-witness who had a more prominent role in
an interaction. However, it is difficult to discern if normative influences or informational
influences are at play or if a combination of both is creating the effects. Thus, future
research should focus on understanding the underlying mechanisms associated in these
situations. Using that information researchers will be better able to inform authorities
about the effects a person’s role plays in later memory recall.
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Table 1
The frequencies of the person responding first with the person responding second (Study
1).

0
2
0
1
0
1
0

Person responding first identified:
2
3
4
5
6
Not
there
2
1
3
3
1
0
6
11
7
7
5
22
2
7
1
5
2
8
2
6
5
1
5
15
5
2
8
2
1
5
3
0
5
2
0
6
0
1
0
1
0
4

4

36

1
Person
respondin
g second
identified

1
2
3
4
5
6
Not
there
Total

24

49

24

22

17

Total
10
60
25
35
23
17
6
176

Table 2
Whether the second person conformed or not depending on if they were the bystander or
the actor (Study 1).
The Second Responder
Did not conform

Did conform

Actor
(interacted)

70 (75.3%)

23 (24.7%)

Bystander

46 (55.4%)

37 (44.6%)

Column total

116 (65.9%)

60 (34.1%)
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Table 3
Agreement for actors and bystanders for interaction questions 2 and 4 (Study 2).
Statistical differences marked with an asterisk.
Q2*
Act
Agree

Bys

22% 35%

Q4*
Act

Bys

6% 19%

Q5
Act

Q6

Bys

42% 35%

Act

Bys

12% 14%

Table 4
Lineup Agreement for actors and bystanders (Study 2).
Target Present
Target Absent
Confederate ID

Actor Bystander

Actor Bystander

Wrong

11%

22%

26%

31%

Right

71%

89%

50%

48%

41%

56%

38%

40%
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Figure 1
Confederate and target-absent lineup (Study 1).
Fillers
1

2

4

5

3

Confederate
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6

Figure 2
Model of how normative and informational influences affect memory conformity from
Wright, London & Waechter, 2010.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Informed Consent Study 1
Dan Wright, senior professor at Florida International University, is conducting the
present study. Marianna Carlucci, a graduate student in the Psychology Department at
FIU, is aiding in the research. The title of the study is “Memory for People.” You are
about to participate in a study about how people remember others. We ask that you read
this form and if you have any questions please contact us before agreeing to participate in
this study. We expect your participation will take about 10 minutes of your time.
If you agree to be a part of this study you will be asked to answer a series of questions
about your memory. You may discontinue your participation at any time if you are not
comfortable answering the questions asked during the study.
Any information obtained during this study that could identify you will be kept strictly
confidential. The information gained from this study may be published in scientific
journals or presented at scientific meetings, but your identity will be kept strictly
confidential. All research records will be kept in a secure location; only the researchers
will have access to the records.
Your decision to participate is voluntary and will not affect your future relations with
Florida International University. If you decided to participate, you are free to discontinue
participation at any time.
There are benefits in participating in this study. You will learn about the research process
and gain a better understanding of how psychological research can be applied to the legal
system. Risks associated with this research, if any, are minimal. You may feel
uncomfortable providing personal information, however your responses are all
confidential, and you are welcome to discontinue your participation if you are
uncomfortable. Some of the questions ask about your gender, your ethnicity, and your
age. Please feel free to leave any of those items unanswered if you feel that the answers
may reveal your identity.
The primary researchers conducting this study are Dr. Dan Wright and Marianna
Carlucci. You may ask any questions you have now or later by emailing Dan Wright at
Daniel.Wright@fiu.edu or calling 305-348-1827. If you would like to talk with someone
about your rights of being a subject in this study you may contact Dr. Patricia Price, the
Chairperson of the FIU Institutional Review Board at 305-348-2618 or 305-348-2494.
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I read and understood the information presented above. All of my questions have
been answered to my satisfaction. I consent to take part in the study.

Print Name: ____________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________
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Appendix B
Informed Consent Study 2
Marianna Carlucci, a graduate student in the Psychology Department at Florida
International University, is conducting the present research study. Daniel Wright, a
professor in the Psychology Department at FIU, is supervising the research. The title of
the study is “Information Gathering”. During your time in this study, you will fill out
questionnaires about how you gather information. You will then complete some questions
about the study content as well as demographic questions. This study should take about
an hour of your time.
The results of this study may be published, but neither your name nor identity will be
revealed and all of the data and information collected from you will remain anonymous.
All data will be identified with numbers that have no links to you as a research
participant, and will be kept in a secure place. Nonetheless, some of the questions on the
demographic sheet ask about, among other things, your gender, your ethnicity, and your
age. Please feel free to leave any of those items unanswered if you feel that the answers
may reveal your identity.
Participation in this study may benefit you by allowing you to become better informed
about the research process. This study may benefit society by contributing to the
understanding of how people gather information. You will receive 1 credit for
participating in the present study.
There are minimal risks and discomforts associated with this research, but feel free to
leave any question blank if you would rather not answer.
Your participation is voluntary. If any aspect of this experiment makes you
uncomfortable, remember that you are free to abort the study at any time. You are free to
decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely
affecting your relationship with the investigators or Florida International University.
Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty to you or loss of any benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled. Furthermore, withdrawal from this study will not harm your
relationship with the psychology department at FIU. Check with your instructor for
alternatives to participation.
For questions or concerns about this study you may contact Marianna Carlucci at 305348-6175 or Mcarl003@fiu.edu. You may also contact Daniel Wright at (305) 348-1827
or dwright@fiu.edu If you feel that you were mistreated or would like to talk with
someone about your rights as a volunteer in this research study you may contact Dr.
Patricia Price, the Chairperson of the FIU Institutional Review Board at 305-348-2618 or
305-348-2494.
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I have read and understood the information presented above. The
researchers have answered all the questions I had to my satisfaction. I
consent to take part in the “Information Gathering” study.
Print Name: ___________________________________
Signature:_____________________________________
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Appendix C
Demographics Questionnaire
1. What is your age?

____________ Years

2. What is your gender?

Check one:

Male

Female

3. Which of the following categories best reflects your ethnic/racial identity? (check
only one)
_____ African American

_____ Asian/Pacific Island

_____ Caucasian: Non-Hispanic

_____ Hispanic

_____ Native American

_____ Other ________________________

4. What is the highest education level you have completed?
_____ high school graduate

_____ junior year in college

_____ freshman year in college

_____ senior year in college

_____ sophomore year in college

_____ graduate school or other __________

7. What is your current work status? Check one:
Employed full time

Employed part time

Unemployed

8. What is your occupation? _____________________________________
9. What is your current marital status?
Single

Check one:

Married

Divorced

Widowed

10. What is your political affiliation?
Democrat

Republican

_____ Other
11. What languages do you speak? ____________________________
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No affiliation

Appendix D
Confederate 2 Script
(Confederate 2 enters room) “Do you know where the Research Assistant is?” … “Oh, I
participated an hour ago and she sent me an email to come back in 30 minutes because I
forgot to sign the consent form and she can’t give me credit for my abnormal psych class
with Professor Perez unless I sign it. Hmm…I guess I can come back after my Sociology
class gets out in an hour. Damn, but I have another study in DM 142 at the same time.
Okay, I’ll e-mail her, don’t worry.”

54

Appendix E
Video Memory Questionnaire
1. The documentary describes American society in what year? (2057)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
2. What does the grandfather throw in his suitcase? (Cowboy hat; a pair of pants)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
3. What is the name of the boy in the documentary? (Paul)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
4. The German scientist configured two cameras to follow his eyes. What green shapes
surround his eyes on the computer? (Squares; Circles)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
5. Where does the boy’s mother work? (Police headquarters, Lawyer)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
6. When the boy tries to hack into the system, what words are displayed on his
computer? (Access denied; Wrong password)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
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Appendix F
Interruption Memory Questionnaire
Research Assistant: “Now I’d like to ask you some questions about your time in the
laboratory. A girl came looking for me, is that correct? She is actually working for the
study and I’d like to ask you some questions about her time here.”
1. How long ago did she say she participated? (An hour ago)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
2. What class did she say her credit would be applied to? (abnormal psych, intro to
psych)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
3. How did she say I contacted her? (Through e-mail)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
4. What professor did she say she was taking the class with? (Perez, Gomez)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
5. What class was she headed to? (Sociology, Anthropology)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
6. What room did she say the other study was in? (DM 142, DM 180)
Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
Research Assistant: “Okay, now I’d like each of you to pick her out of this lineup. What
number is she? How confident are you in your decision?”
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Participant 1: ________________________________________________
Participant 2: ________________________________________________
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Appendix G
Cost of Disagreeing Questionnaire
Please circle the response that best represents your level of agreement with each
statement.
1. It is more important to be right than it is to be liked.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neutral

5
Slightly
agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
agree

2. To avoid a possible conflict, I would rather agree with others even when I know
that they are wrong.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neutral

5
Slightly
agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
agree

3. Sometimes I feel obligated to agree with others even when I know that they are
wrong.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neutral

5
Slightly
agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
agree

4. It makes me feel uncomfortable to disagree with someone even when I know that
I am right.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neutral
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5
Slightly
agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
agree

5. When I know the correct answer to a question, I always speak up even if it
requires telling someone else that they have answered incorrectly.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3
Slightly
disagree

4
Neutral

59

5
Slightly
agree

6
Agree

7
Strongly
agree

Appendix H
Suspicion Questionnaire
1. What do you think this study is about?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2. Do you feel like you were deceived or were you suspicious about anything during
your time in this study?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix I
Debriefing
Thank you for your participation. I would now like to tell you a bit more about the study
that you just participated in. Much research has investigated how what one person says
influences what other people say. This is called memory conformity. In this study we
were interested in knowing how the role someone plays in an interaction affects their
susceptibility to memory conformity. That is, would memory conformity be higher
depending on whether the participant was the actor or bystander in an interaction. This
study will help researchers form a theoretical model for why memory conformity occurs
and under what conditions it is more likely to occur. The person you interacted with and
the person you thought was another participant were actually confederates (working with
the researcher of this study) who were asked to answer a certain way. I hope you enjoyed
partaking in the study and hope you will not tell other people about this study. It is very
important that the people who participate in the study not know what the study is really
about. This will ensure that our results are based on the stimulus material used and not
expectations about what the study is about. Thus, it would be very helpful to us if you did
not discuss the study with anyone you know as they might participate in the study in the
future. At this time I would like to answer any questions you might have about the study
you just participated in.
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